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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
X

Petitioner,

Index No.

-against-

VERIFIED PETITION

TINA M. STANFORD, as Commissioner of the New
York State Board of Parole,

Respondent,
Seeking an Order Pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR.
X

Petitioner, by his undersigned counsel, as and for his Petition, alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION
1.

This is a proceeding challenging the decision of the NY State Board of Parole to

deny parole to Petitioner, parole which by all lawful considerations, should have resulted in his
release from prison on July 9, 2020. But the Board did not act lawfully, it acted arbitrarily and in

violation of the applicable provisions of the Executive Law. “[W]hen there is a showing of

irrationality bordering on impropriety,” the court may intervene and determine if the Board's
decision denying parole was arbitrary and capricious. Silmon , id.; Marino v. Travis , 13 AD3d
453, 454 (2d Dept. 2004);” Matter

of Matter of Weinstein v Dennison , 801 N.Y.S.2d 244, 7

Misc. 3d 1009(A) (Sup CtNY County 2005). This is just such a case.
PARTIES
2.

is a resident of New York County. At the time of both his arrest

and his incarceration he resided on

ith his mother. At the present time he is

incarcerated at Gowanda State Prison in Gowanda, New York.
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Tina M. Stanford is sued as Commissioner of the New York State Board of

Parole, a division of the NY State Department of Correctional and Community Services
(DOCCS). The Board of Parole is located at 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York.
VENUE

4.

At the time of his arrest and incarceration Petitioner resided in New York County.

The crime which he was convicted of occurred in New York County. His trial Judge was a
Justice of Supreme Court in New York County. Venue is proper in New York County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

5.

Petitioner

is a 32-year-oldresident of New York County, who,

prior to May 2017, had ever been arrested. He is an electrical engineer, who at the time of his arrest
was employedby the City of New York in its program to rebuildhomes destroyed in Superstorm

Sandy in 2012, a $2 billion project for which he had major responsibilities as an analyst.
6.

Petitioner was arrested on May 25, 2017, after turning over his computer to the

NYPD voluntarily on March 29, 2017. That computer was forensically analyzed by the NYPD.

According to the Criminal Complaint (Exhibit A), “on November 26, 2018 [a date 18 months
after

was arrested]

at 230 East 21 Street in the County and State of New

York [which happens to be the 13th Precinct of the NYPD], the defendant, knowing the character
and content thereof, produced, directed, and promoted a performance which included sexual
conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age; the defendant, knowing the character and
content thereof, knowingly had in his possession and control a performance which included

sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.” The Complaint alleged that the
Detective who examined the laptop “uncovered [through forensic reconstruction] over 3,000

images and 89 videos depicting young nude females between the approximates ages of 6 months
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and 16, engaging in sexual conduct.” Mr.

was released on the day of his arrest, on

$7500 bail, with no restrictions on his conduct; the lack of restrictions continued until his

surrender on July 10, 2020.
7.

Shortly after his arrest Mr.

was indicted. His indictment (Exhibit B) had

66 counts, involving 33 of the images allegedly on his computer. Each count alleged that his
computer contained an image on March 29, 2017 (the day he turned over his computer), in

violation of Penal Law 263.15 and 263.16 promoting a “performance which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age.” Forensics later showed that those images
hadbeen downloaded and deleted in February 2015.
8.

Immediately after his arrest, and right through the date of his incarceration, Mr.
engaged in intensive psychotherapy with Dr. Richard B. Krueger, MD, and Dr. Meg

Kaplan who specialize in evaluating and treating individuals who are paraphilic, hypersexual, or
perpetrators of sexual abuse. In his April 8, 2019 report to the Sentencing Court (Ex. C) (a
report the Parole Board had when it made the challenged decision listed below), Dr. Krueger

reported that M.

had been in weekly individual therapy with Dr. Kaplan, and group

therapy with Dr. Douglas Martinez, and had had more than 100 treatment sessions. According
to Dr. Krueger “ Thefocus

prevention treatment. Mr .

of both therapies has been cognitive behavioral and relapse
has absorbed techniques of relapse prevention and has

reported no urges to view ... child pornography since he has been in therapy. He has been a
very active member in his group therapy. He has come to all appointments withoutfail and

has completed all homework assignments that have been assigned. ”
9.

Dr. Krueger then explained his Risk Assessment of Mr.
“In my original comprehensive report to you of July 7^, 2017, 1
noted that Mr .
had low scores on 4 actuarial
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instruments used to assess the risk of another sexual crime (the
SVR-20, the SONAR, the Level of Service/Case Management
Inventory, and the Hare Psychopathy Checklist) and a moderatelow score on another , the Static-99R. Since that original
assessment, another instrument, which has been validated
extensively in Canada, has come into use, the Child Pornography
Offender Risk Tool (CPORT). It relies on scoring of a number of
demographic factors and aspects of the offending behavior ; ii
results in a score of Oto 7, the higher the score the greater the
risk. Mr .
had a score of 2, placing him in a category
with a predicted recidivism rate of 11.1% over 5 years, this rate
being for crimes involving child pornography, actual contact
sexual offenses, or both. This is viewed generally as a low rate.
has shown absolutely no evidence of urges to view
Mr .
child pornography in the two years that he has been in our
treatment program and has learned an enormous amount. It
remains the opinion of Dr. Martinez, Dr. Kaplan, and myself
that his risk of sexually re-offense is exceedingly remote.

10.

After discussing Mr.

f the number of images Mr.

.

possessed, and the disturbing nature of the images involved Dr. Krueger concluded with the
following opinion:
It remains the opinion ofDrs. Martinez, Kaplan and myself that Mr .
's risk of abusing a child is remote and is being further
reduced through sex offender specific therapy and the monitoring
that will be imposed by the legal system. I have mentioned before
and will mention again that it has been shown that neither
incarceration as a single variable, nor the length of incarceration,
is associated with a reduction in risk of recidivism and for Mr.
incarceration would be extremely destructive. Drs.
Martinez, Kaplan and I have been for two years and continue to
be firmly of the opinion that Mr.
's efforts to engage in
therapy and rehabilitate himself have been extraordinary; he has
embraced sex offender specific therapy fully and made great
progress to date.

11.

Resolution of Petitioner’s criminal case did not occur until June 2019. The

District Attorney, with the court’s approval, agreed to a plea to one count of violation of Penal
Law 263.15, described as “promoting sexual performance by a minor.”

pleaded guilty

to that one count on May 28, 2019, two years, and three days after he had been arrested. (The
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transcript of his plea is annexed as Exhibit D.) After the plea, the Court allowed

to

remain free, without restriction, until his sentencing date.
12.

The Pre-Sentencing Report (Exhibit E) found that

began viewing child

pornography at age 10, and that he had ceased viewing such since his arrest.
13.

On July 10, 2019 Mr.

was sentenced to a one to three-year term of

incarceration. The transcript of the sentencing, by Judge Steven Statinsger, is annexed as Exhibit
F. On that date Petitioner surrendered and began serving his sentence.
14.

Petitioner was incarcerated at Rikers Island, then the Ulster Correctional Facility,

then Gouveneur Correctional Facility, and then, on October 31, 2019, he arrived at Gowanda
Correctional Facility, a prison with extensive programming for prisoners convicted of sex

offenses. It was only when he got to Gowanda that he was able to participate in the Sex Offender

Counseling and Treatment Program; his participation started on November 18, 2019.
15.

Petitioner was scheduled for an appearance before the Board of Parole on

March 4, 2020.
16.

Dr. Krueger wrote a letter to the Board of Parole on January 29, 2020 Exhibit G),

stating:
This letter is to certify that our program has accepted and will
continue to accept Mr .
into our treatment program
for sexual offenders, which is described in the appended leaflet.
was a patient in our program from May 27th,
In fact, Mr .
,
2017 to June 24th 2019, when he was incarcerated. At all times he
was a highly motivated and compliant patient who made exceptional
progress.
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Therapeutic Work in Prison/ COMPASS Assessment/Certificate of Earned Eligibility

17.

On January 21, 2020, Petitioner’s Counselor at Gowanda, Jessica Deitman,

prepared a Risk Assessment, utilizing the COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management
Profiling for Alternative Sanction) analytical process. (See Exhibit H). That COMPAS
assessment, which was in the record before the Parole Board, rated Mr.

levels of Risk and Probability of Recidivism. On all scales assessed Mr.

at the lowest

had the

lowest possible score in every category. The Screener’s Recommended Supervision Status was

“1.” She found “no potential faking concern. She found “no inconsistent response concerns.” The
Assessment rated Negative Social Cognition as “unlikely.” The Assessment found Mr.

“is unlikely to have low self-efficacy in his ability to deal with the various challenges of
reentering the community.” It also found that he had strong family support, that he was unlikely
to have significant financial problems. (The Board also had before it a letter from an employer

confirming the availability of employment for Mr.
18.
Mr.

upon release. (ExhibitI))

On February 20, 2019 Ms. Deitman prepared a Monthly Evaluation which rated
at the highest end of “Motivated,” and which stated Inmate appears to understand

the material and how it applies. He recently took on a role in the hierarchy. Inmate’s assignments
show an understanding of how the material applies.” The Evaluation is annexed as Exhibit J.
19.

Additionally, on February 12, 2020 Mr.

was issued a Certificate of

Earned Eligibility (Exhibit K), a fact communicated to the Division of Parole.
20.

Prior to the hearing the Board of Parole did not ask the sentencing judge or the

District Attorney for their position on Mr.

’ parole.
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The Parole Hearing

21.

Mr.

’ Parole Hearing occurred on March 4, 2020. Prior to the hearing the

Board was presented with all of the material discussed above, including a copy of the Scoring

Guide for Child Pornography Risk Tool (Exhibit L), referred to by Dr. Krueger, was submitted to

the Board, as well as letters of support from Mr.

f 97 year old grandmother (Exhibit M),

mother (a psychotherapist) (Exhibit N) , father (Exhibit O), sister (Exhibit P), and aunt (Exhibit Q),
all attesting to his developing self-awareness and understanding of the crime he had committed and
the reasons for his behavior, and of his transformation as a person. There were also letters from his

prospective employer (Keyworthy), ExhibitI, the Fortune Society (accepting Mr.

into

their program) (Exhibit R), his Defense Counsel (Exhibit S), and several friends
22.

The following is Mr.

’ written recollection of the interview Exhibit T):

“I was called down at 12:10pm on Wednesday, March 4th, to wait
in the lobby of the building with the video conference room. I then
waited there until about 3:15pm, when I was finally called into the
room. When I sat down, there were two women on my left operating
the equipment, and the camera on the other end of the video on the

screen appeared to be pointed at the ceiling. They left me sitting there
sitting for what felt like 10 minutes (though I don ’t know the exact
amount of time) with the camera pointed at the ceiling. Ido know that
it was unusually long, though, because the women on my left started
talking to each other trying tofigure out what the delay was.

Finally, they repositioned the camera, and the interview began. At
first the camera was zoomed out, so I could see all three
commissioners, but it almost immediately zoomed in on the
commissioner on my left. He started by introducing himself and then
the other two commissioners. And then he asked me to identify
myself as well (name, DIN, birth date).
23.

The Transcript of the hearing Exhibit U) picks up from there.
a.

The Parole Board Chairman, Commissioner Berliner, explained that “ we

will talk about the crime and your background .. about how you have done in in the year or so since
you have been incarcerated and then we will go through your plans for release.” Transcript at 2.
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b.

After eliciting an affirmative response to the question about a conviction by

plea agreement then described the charge as possession of “more than 3000 images and 89 videos
depicting young nude females between the ages of six months and 12 months engaging in sexual

conduct such as vaginal intercourse and performing oral sex on an adult male.” Transcript at 2-3.
c.

Although this had never been the charge, notr the indictment, nor the plea,

Petitioner admitted that he “did possess images over a period of time.”

d.

Berliner then asked “ What happened here?” Petitioner responded with a

long answer going back to when he was 10 years old, a discussion of his depression and how

viewing all sorts of pornography as “depression relief.” He continued, “ It was somethingInever

spoke about with anybody, even thoughIdesperately wanted to speak with someone about it.I
was actually in therapy for some issues ...andIdesperately wanted to talk to my therapist about

this but was scared to....It was somethingIhad to deal with completely on my own. It really,

really tore me apart. LikeIevolved an enormous amount of self-loathing about it, depression and
it kind of spiralled because of that. The depression thatIfelt because of it would lead me to

doing it more because it was my outlet, which leads to more depression.” Transcript at 4-5.
e.

After discussing what types of pornography Petitioner watched, and the

frequency, and about what Petitioner described as an addiction that he felt ashamed about,
Commissioner Berliner asked about the sex offender programming at Gowanda. Petitioner stated

that he was “pleasantly surprised in terms of not just the tools, but also language to be able to
more appropriately describe ...whatIwas dealing with and relate to other people who were

dealing with similar things.” Transcript at 9.
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f.

Commissioner Berliner then asked “did you ever take your pornography to

the next step?” Petitioner responded that the pornography he viewed pushed him away adverse, in
his relationships, “to anything particularly sexually adventurous or deviant.” Transcript at 9-10.
g-

Commissioner Berliner then asked a brief question about Petitioner’s risk

assessment, and his electrical trades training in prison, and his employment, and the noted that at

the sentencing hearing Petitioner’s lawyer had asked Judge Statsinger to recommend as a parole
condition, “which we don’t see every day,” that Petitioner be permitted to continue the private

therapy he had begun. Transcript at 11.
h.

Commissioner Berliner then discussed Petitioner’s family, and about the

report from Dr. Krueger. He then asked (Transcript at 15) whether Petitioner had compulsions

during the two years between his arrest and incarceration to “go back and view pornography.”
Petitioner admitted to “compulsions” and stated that as a result of therapy and discussions with
his girlfriend, mother, father and sister, he was able to “defuse it ... in a way thatIdidn’t have

before and was able to handle it.”

.

l

Commissioner Berlin then reviewed a letter about Petituoner’s promise of

employment, his post-prison living situation (with his mother) and his post release support.
(Transcript at 16).
J-

Commissioner Berlin then mention Petitioner’s Certificate of Earned

Eligibility, and asked whether there was anything else Petitioner though the Board needed to
know. Petitioner stated “ “I am extremely sorry for what I did and it is something that I know a
lot of people talk about —I mean, I heard a lot of people through therapy talk about wanting to
put this sort of situation behind them, but I very much don ’t. I —this is something that I want to
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carry with mefor the rest of my

life productively .

I want to use it either to help other people in

similar situations or justfor myself ”

k.

Then, when the Commissioner followed up with: “One last questionI

neglected to ask you ... This is not a victimless crime,” (Transcript at page 17) the following
exchange occurred:
A.

No. Absolutely not.

Q. ... [W]hat do you think about the little children out there who
were brutalized along the way.
A.

... I think it is really horrible and it cuts me pretty deep when
I think about it. In the days and months and years since my
arrest I have experienced a small fraction of the exposure

that they experienced in having the porn created and I can
say from my own experiences that that has been pretty
devastating and I can ’t imagine how devastating to them. It
would have that be—for something completely out of your
control, but also from a very young age and just for your
entire life ... I mean, it cuts me pretty deep. That is part of
why this is not something I want to put behind me, because I
do think that having this experience and also having the
experience leading up to it of the behavior I exhibited, I hope
that I have something to contribute to preventing, you know,
further abuse or dissemination ofporn in thefuture. ”
The Decision
24.

On March 10, the Board of Parole issued its decision (which is part of the

Transcript, (Exhibit U) indicating that it was dictated by the Commissioners immediately after

Petitioner left the hearing). The relevant part read as follows:
“ The Board of Parole congratulates you on your certificate
of earned eligibility. However, despite the presumption created in
your favor, a review of the record, a personal interview and
deliberation leads the panel to conclude that there is a reasonable
probability that if released at this time, you would not live and
remain at liberty without again violating the law. Accordingly,
parole is denied. Your instant offense of promoting a sexual

10
10 of 46

INDEX NO.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/13/2020
FUSL000093

performance by a child represents your first NYS incarceration and
only conviction of record.
Your case plan goals are appropriate and you have been
engaged in programming, including SOCTP and vocational
training. Your disciplinary record is clean. Your institutional
adjustment is to your credit. The COMPAS risk assessment indicates
low risk in every category. The panel departsfrom the COMPASfor
several reasons. First, there is the nature of the crime itself, which
involved you possessing pornographic images and videos of
children over a period of time. Second, while the panel
acknowledges your work in programming before and during your
incarceration, there are concerns that you lack some insight into the
harm your actions caused, however indirectly . While you were able
to discuss the crimes clearly and with significant insight into what
led you to your behaviors, your discussions of the children who were
harmed required prompting and remained abstract and
disconnected from real empathy. As such, the panel concludes that
your rehabilitation is not yet complete and recommends that you
spend this time completing recommended programming and
working to gain that insight. The panel has considered your letters
of support, including from your attorney, and the packet submitted
on your behalf. At this time, however, with all factors weighed and
considered, the panel concludes that your discretionary release
would be incompatible with the welfare of society. ”
25.

The panel then set a date of a new hearing in 18 months, September 2021.

Petitioner’s Conditional Release date is July 10, 2021.
26.

Mr.

filed a timely appeal on March 16, 2020, with a request for a

transcript.
27.

On April 13, 2020 his attorney perfected his appeal. A copy of the letter argument

is annexed as Exhibit V. The appeal was perfected without benefit of the hearing transcript.
28.

On May 31, 2020, after receipt of the Transcript, a supplemental letter was

submitted; a copy is annexed as Exhibit W.
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THE GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS

29.

The Parole Board is governed by New York’s Executive Law, principally § 259-1,

which authorizes the Parole Board to promulgate regulations. Regulations have the force of law,
if properly promulgated and consistent with the Executive Law. The Regulations are codified in

9 NYCRR 8000-8011. We focus on those standards which the Parole Board did not comply with
in making its decision in Mr.

.

A

’ case.

The Executive Law
30.

Executive Law 259 -i(2)(a): requires the Parole Board to interview parole-eligible

people at least one month before the parole eligibility date, and to set the next interview/review
(“hold”) no later than 24 months from then if parole is denied. The law states: “If parole is not

granted upon such review, the inmate shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such
appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in

detail and not in conclusory terms.”
31.

This part of the law requires the Parole Board to inform an applicant who has

been denied parole of the reasons for the denial, in writing. The reasons must be explained in

detail in the written decision, and cannot be “conclusory,” which means that evidence supporting
the decision must be provided.
32.

If the Parole Board issues a decision that does not sufficiently explain the reasons

for the parole denial or does not refer to evidence in support of the decision, the decision is

reversable.
33.

Executive Law 259 -i(2)(C)(A) states: “Discretionary release on parole shall not

be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while
confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released,
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he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not

incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as
to undermine respect for law.”

34.

Section 259-i(2)(C)(A) then lists the factors the Parole Board must consider when

deciding whether to release someone to parole supervision. While case law provides that the

Board need not give equal weight to each factor, it does mandate that each factor be considered.
These factors are:
(1)

Achievements while incarcerated: “the institutional record including

program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or

work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff and inmates”
(2)

Temporary work release: “performance, if any, as a participant in a

temporary release program”

(3)

Post-release plans: “release plans including community resources,

employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate”
(4)

Immigration issues: “any deportation order issued by the federal

government against the inmate while in the custody of the department and any recommendation

regarding deportation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one
hundred forty-seven of the correction law”
(5)

Victim statements: “any statement made to the board by the crime victim

or the victim’s representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically

incapacitated”
(6)

Type/length of sentence: “the length of the determinate sentence to which

the inmate would be subject had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or
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section 70.71 of the penal law for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article two

hundred twenty-one of the penal law”
(7)

Seriousness of the offense: “the seriousness of the offense with due

consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as

consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to
confinement.”

(8)

Criminal history: “prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern

of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional
confinement.

.

B

Parole Regulations
35.

Guided by the Executive Law, the Parole Board has promulgated a host of

regulations that have the force of law. They cover, inter alia, the interview, post interview

requirements and victim impact statements. See 9 NYCRR 8000-8011.
36.

8 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) reads, in part, “If a Board determination, denying release,

departs from the Department Risk andNeeds Assessment’s scores, the Board shall specify any
scale within the Department Risk andNeeds Assessment from which it departed and provide an
individualized reason for such departure.”
37.

Further, 8 NYCRR § 8002.3(b) reads, in part, “Reasons for the denial of parole

release shall be given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and non-conclusory terms,
and address how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors listed in 8002.2
were considered in the individual’s case.”

14
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Standard of Review

38.

Decisions of the Board of Parole are discretionary and will generally be upheld so

long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements. Executive Law § 259—i. Perea v .

Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dep’t 2017). The Courts, however, have
enunciated a number of factors it will assess, and has on numerous occasions, found Parole

Board decisions reversable.
1)

A Denial Containing Conclusory Statements and Boilerplate Language Particularly
Where in Disputes A COMPAS Assessment Is Reversable
39.

The statute requires the Board to apply three standards of assessment:
a.

Is there “a reasonable probability that, if released, he will live and remain

at liberty without violating the law,

b.

Release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and

c.

Release will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine

respect for law.”

40.

The statute also requires that “I[i] parole is not granted upon such review, the

inmate shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and
reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory

terms.” EL §259-i(2)(a) (emphasis added). Parole decisions cannot simply parrot the statutory

language rather than explain in detail the reason for denial.
41.

“[T]he Board’s discretion is not unbridled and must be exercised in accordance

with law. King v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 430 (1st Dept.), Iv . denied 82 NY2d 746
(1993); Ekv. Travis , NYLJ, Feb. 25, 2005 at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co.) (Sheridan,
J.); Cappiello v. N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc. 3d 1010A (Sup.Ct., NY Co., 2004) (Wetzel, J.).

And, since there is a strong rehabilitation component in the statutory parole scheme, the Board is
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mandated to consider an inmate’s institutional record, release plans, the sentence imposed,
recommendations of the district attorney, prior criminal record and activities following arrest and
prior to confinement. Silmon v. Travis , 95 NY2d 470, 476 (2000); King supra at 431; Ek, supra.
Moreover, remorse and insight are proper considerations. Silmon, id. “[W]hen there is a showing

of irrationality bordering on impropriety,” the court may intervene and determine if the Board’s

decision denying parole was arbitrary and capricious. Silmon , id:, Marino v. Travis , 13 AD3d
453, 454 (2d Dept. 2004).” Matter of Matter of Weinstein v Dennison , 801 N.Y.S.2d 244, 7

Misc. 3d 1009(A) (Sup Ct. NY County 2005).
42.

The Board’s failure to explain in detail why release would be “incompatible with

the welfare of society”, or explain in detail why release would so deprecate the seriousness of

the offense as to undermine respect for the law, or to explain in detail why if released there is a
reasonable probability that the parole applicant would violate the law, are each grounds for

annulling the denial and granting a de novo interview/review.
43.

Case law follows the regulations and dictates that the Parole Board’s written

decision is improper if it fails to explain the reasons for denial of parole “in detail and not in
conclusory terms.” N.Y. Exec. Law. 259-i(2)(a) (emphasis supplied); See Rossakis v. N.Y. State

Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016) (“It is unquestionably the duty of the Board to give
fair consideration to each of the applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before
it, and where the record convincingly demonstrates that the Board did in fact fail to consider
the proper standards, the courts must intervene. In particular, ‘[t]he role of the Parole Board is
not to resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate

penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory
factors, he shouldbe released’. In that regard, the statute expressly mandates that the prisoner’s
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educational and other achievements affirmatively be taken into consideration in determining
whether he meets the general criteria relevant to parole release.”); Ramirez v. Evans , 118 A.D.3d
707 (2d Dep’t 2014) (emphasis supplied). Though it need not discuss each factor in detail, a

written decision “may not summarily itemize a petitioner’s achievements while incarcerated
or render a conclusory decision parroting the statutory standard.” Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of

Parole, 14 Misc.3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006) (emphasis supplied).
44.

The written decision must provide some basis to determine how the factors were

weighed and why release was not warranted. See Coaxum , 14 Misc.3d at 662 (“The decision

making is a process of determining which factors outweigh others: a balancing process.”). See
also Platten v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2015).
(“Based on the record and the lack of specificity in the decision, the Court cannot determine

what concern the board had for the public safety and welfare, and why it had that concern at the
time of the interview in 2014.”); Weinstein v. Dennison ,1 Misc. 3d 1009A (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty,
2005) (“...the Board is required to do more than merely mouth the statutory criteria, particularly

whereas here each factor recited and brought forth in the parole interview, other than the crime
itself, militated in favor of release.”); V. Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 100865/18 (Sup. Ct., NY
Cnty, 2019) (Board’s conclusions that petitioner’s release would be incompatible with welfare of

society and would deprecate the seriousness of the crime and therefore undermine respect for the
law merely track the statutory language, without explanation or context...thus, the Court cannot

evaluate their rationality.”); Matter ofWallman v. Travis , 794 NYS2d 381 (1st Dept 2005)( “the
Board’s perfunctory discussion of petitioner’s alleged lack of insight is contrary to the Court
of Appeals’ decision in Matter of Silmon v Travis (95 NY2d at 477), which held that a

petitioner’s remorse and insight into his crimes are highly relevant in evaluating an inmate’s
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rehabilitative progress, especially where, as here, the prisoner has otherwise lived a law-abiding
life and maintained a good prison record. Despite the critical significance of these factors in

evaluating an inmate under the “reasonable probability” standard, the Board’s decision in this
case offers no supportive facts justifying its finding of lack of insight and remorse. The Board’s

lack of supporting facts in its written decision might be excused if the parole hearing record
otherwise supported its conclusion, but in this case it does not. The hearing transcript contains
numerous statements by petitioner demonstrating his understanding of the harm caused by

.

his misconduct and his remorse for it ”)(emphasis supplied).
45.

In 2011, the New York State legislature mandated that the Board establish a more

forward- looking approach to parole consideration by amending the statute to require “written

procedures...incorporating] risk and needs principles...” People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247
(2015). In response, the Board adopted a risk assessment instrument and developed procedures
for how to use the tool.
46.

The instrument, the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative

Sanction (“COMPAS”), was developed by Northpointe Institute for Public Management Inc. It
is administered by an applicant’s Offender Rehabilitation Counselor (ORC) and currently

consists of 74 questions. Answers are tallied and applicants are given a score of low, medium, or

high, indicating the levels of risk as to an array of factors bearing upon public safety if released.
47.

In line with the 2011 legislative changes, the parole regulations were revised to

read: “in making a release determination, the Board shall be guided by risk and needs

principles.” 9 NYCRR 8002.2. That regulation states:
a) Risk and Needs Principles: In making a release determination,

the Board shall be guided by risk and
b) needs principles, including the inmate’s risk andneeds scores as
generated by a periodically-validated risk assessment
18
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instrument, if prepared by the Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (collectively, “Department Risk and
Needs Assessment” . If a Board determination, denying
release, departs from the Department Risk and Needs
Assessment’s scores, the Board shall specify any scale within
the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it
departed and provide an individualized reason for such
departure. If other risk andneed assessments or evaluations are
prepared to assist in determining the inmate’s treatment, release
plan, or risk of reoffending, and such assessments or evaluations
are made available for review at the time of the interview, the
Board may consider these as well.
48.

Failure to perform an analysis of the risk and needs assessment, such as

COMPAS, as required by the regulatory scheme, is grounds for a de novo parole hearing.

Malerba v. Evans, 109 A.D.3d 1067 (3d Dep’t 2013); In re Garfield v. Evans , 108 A.D.3d 830
(3d Dep’t 2013).
49.

The Board must also qualitatively consider the risk and needs assessment, and

there must be evidence of consideration. Diaz v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 976 N.Y.S. 2d
838 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga Cnty. 2013) (“[TJhere is no indication in the parole hearing minutes, the

Board’s decision, or anywhere else in the record that the commissioners charged with weighing
Petitioner’s release even viewed, much less considered, the COMPAS risk assessment in making

their determination ... The mere existence of a COMPAS risk assessment in an inmate’s file,
as here, is not enough. There must be some indication that the Board complied with the

statute by considering the results of the COMPAS in reaching its decision.”)(emphasis

supplied).
50.

In addition, the Parole Board Regulations 9 NYCRR 8002.3 were revised in 2017

to state:

“Reasons for the denial of parole release shallbe given in detail, and
shall, in factually individualized and non-conclusory terms, address
how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors
listed in 8002.2 were considered in the individual’s case.”
19
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This is a significant change because arguably the Board must now explain more

than the reason for denial, it must explain in detail how each “principle and factor” was factored
into that decision.
52.

Furthermore, the Regulations were revised in 2017 to also state:

“If a Board determination, denying release, departs from the
Department Risk and Needs Assessment’s scores, the Board
shall specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs
Assessment from which it departed and provide an
individualized reason for such departure.”
9 NYCRR 8002.2(a). (emphasis supplied)
53.

These revisions became effective in September of 2017. Case law construing the

new regulations include:

Comfort v. Stanford, 2018/1445 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty, 2018) (finding the

-

Board did not comply with 8002.2(a) by failing to explain its departure from the lowest possible
COMPAS risk scores of felony violence, arrest and absconding yet concluding that there was a

reasonable probability the petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the

law.);
-Diaz

v. Stanford, 2017/53088 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty 2018) (noting the

upcoming changes in the regulations and finding the denial decision did not explain the stark
contrast between the COMPAS scores and the Board’s conclusion.)(emphasis supplied);
-Matter

of Coleman v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision , 157

A.D.3d 672, 673 (2d Dep’t 2018) (reversing denial of Art. 78 petition because “the petitioner ...
was assessed “low” for all risk factors on his COMPAS risk assessment. Thus, a review of the

record demonstrates that in light of all of the factors, notwithstanding the seriousness of the
underlying offense, the Parole Board’s ‘determination to deny the petitioner release on parole

evinced irrationality bordering on impropriety.’”);
20
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-Robinson

v. Stanford, No. 2392/2018, at * 2 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019)

(ordering de novo interview for man with two murder convictions and low COMPAS scores

because “the Parole Board’s finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the
welfare of society directly contradicts these scores in his COMPAS assessment. As the

Board’s determination denying release departed from these risks and needs assessment scores,
pursuant to 9 NYCRR § 8002.2 it was required to articulate with specificity the particular

scale in any needs and assessment from which it was departing and provide an
individualized reason for such departure. The Board’s conclusory statement that it considered
statutory factors, including petitioner’s risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and needs for

successful community re- entry in finding that discretionary release would not be compatible

with the welfare of society fails to meet this standard. As such, its determination denying parole
release was affected by an error of law.”) (emphasis added)
54.

Even before revision of the regulations, the First Department held that the Parole

Board violated the statutory requirement that the reasons for denial not be conclusory when they

“summarily listed petitioner’s institutional achievements and then denied parole with no further
analysis of them.” Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016). A
reviewing court will look at the plain text of the parole denial to determine if it is merely

boilerplate language. See In re Ciaprazi v. Evans , 52 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty.
2016) (“A plain and fair reading of the respondent’s decision to deny parole leads to the

inescapable conclusion that it is a simple regurgitation of standard boilerplate parole board denial
language.”); Ruzas v. New York State Board of Parole, No. 1456/2016, slip op. at 4 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 18, 2017) (holding the Board in contempt for conducting defective de novo
interview after the Court set aside the initial decision because “the Board summarily denied
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[petitioner’s] application without any explanation other than by reiterating the laundry list of
statutory factors. The minimal attention, barely lip service, given to these factors and to the

COMPAS Assessment cannot be justified given the amount of time already served.”);

55.

The Board must provide insight into how it reached its decision, instead of merely

listing the factors it considered. In re McBride v. Evans , 42 Misc.3d 1230A (Sup. Ct. Dutchess
Cnty, 2014) (“While the Board discussed petitioner’s positive activities and accomplishments at

the hearing, it then concluded that his release was incompatible with ‘public safety and welfare.’
The Board gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this conclusion. It appears to have
focused only on petitioner’s past behavior without articulating a rational basis for reaching its

conclusion that his release would be incompatible with the welfare of society at this time.”) See

also, Morris v . N.Y. State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct.
Columbia Cnty. 2013) (“the Board failed to explain, other than the facts of the crime, why

petitioner’s release was ‘incompatible with the public safety and welfare’ and why there was ‘a
reasonable probability [he] would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.’ ... the
Board ‘should be well able to articulate the reasoning’ for its decision, ‘if it were come to

reasonably, in a non-arbitrary, un-capricious manner.’”); Stokes v. Stanford, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op.
50899(U), at *2 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. June 9, 2014) (granting de novo interview after noting

that petitioner’s “COMPAS report found him at low risks in all categories it considered....
Although the determination parrots the applicable statutory language, the Board does not
even attempt to explain the disconnect between its conclusion and petitioner’s

rehabilitation efforts and his low risk scores.”) (emphasis supplied).
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2) Failure to Consider Full Record / Failure to “Qualitatively Weigh” the Applicable
Factors Is Grounds for A Rehearing
56.

Considering relevant statutory factors requires more than a mere reference to “the

record.” For example, a categorical dismissal of achievements is grounds for overturning the
Board’s decisions. In Cappiello , eight out of ten pages of the applicant’s interview transcript
were dedicated to the details of the applicant’s instant offense, a murder that occurred in 1976.

While the applicant directed the Board’s attention to the numerous factors supporting parole
release, “there is no indication in the record as to whether the commissioners read those materials
or considered them in any way.” Cappiello v . N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc.3 d 1010A (Sup.

Ct., NY Cnty, 2004). The parole denial merely stated, “After a review of the record and this

interview parole is again denied” before listing the details of the instant offense and concluding

that “your release at this time would pose a threat to public safety.” Cappiello , 6 Misc.3d
1010(A). (“When the record of the Parole hearing fails to convincingly demonstrate that the

Parole Board ... qualitatively weighfed] the relevant factors in light of the three statutorily

acceptable standards for denying parole release, the decision is arbitrary and capricious.”). See
also Johnson v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“the record is devoid
of any indication that the Parole Board in fact considered the statutory factors that weighed in
favor of petitioner’s release ... In fact, during the notably truncated hearing, the Parole Board
focused on matters unrelated to any statutory factor.”); Pulinario v. N.Y. State Dep ’t of Corr. &

Cmty. Supervision, 42 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty, 2014) (“[T]he Parole Board’s

overwhelming emphasis was on the offense ... At the hearing, there were only passing
references to the contents of petitioner’s application. In the decision there was only a

perfunctory mention of all the statutory factors that weighed in Pulinario’s favor.”) (emphasis

supplied); Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 14 Misc.3d 661 (2006) (“actual consideration of
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factors means more than acknowledging that evidence of them was before the Board.”); V.
Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 100865 /18 (Sup Ct., NY Cnty, 2019) (“There is no explanation

why the 25 year old crime outweighed the voluminous evidence that indicates petitioner would
presently be able to lead a quiet and crime-free life in society.”).
3) Reiving on an Inaccurate Record, or a Decision Unsupported by the Record
57.

When the Board bases its decision on assertions not supported by the record, or an

inaccurate record, these are grounds for annulling the denial and granting a de novo interview.
Rivera v. Stanford, 2019 WL 2030503, at *2 (2d Dep’t 2019) (Board’s finding that release was
not compatible with the welfare of society based upon prison disciplinary record was without

support in the record); Coleman v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty. Supervision , 157

A.D.3d 672, 673 (2d Dep’t 2018) (“Contrary to the Parole Board’s determination that the

petitioner ‘distance[d]’ himself from the crime, the record demonstrates that the petitioner took
full responsibility for his actions...”).
58.

The Board is required to rely on a “fair view” of the record. In Rossakis , the

Board “inappropriately relied on claims in decedent’s family’s victim impact statements that
were affirmatively rebutted by the objective evidence supporting petitioner’s release,” such as

their claim that the petitioner would have nowhere to go when released when “the record makes
clear that petitioner had secured a job offer and was taking concrete steps to secure housing.”
Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016).
59.

In Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d. 1036 (3d Dep’t 2016), the court granted

petitioner a de novo interview based on the Board’s “characterization of the petitioner’s
disciplinary history as showing ‘marginal compliance with DOCCS rules,’ which it strongly
relied upon in denying parole, lacked support in the record.” There, petitioner’s only DOCCS
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violation occurred “during a period in which, through no fault of his own and due to the
recommendation of a prison physician, the petitioner was deprived of medication for his mental
illness.” The court ultimately held that “for the Board to ... rely upon petitioner’s conduct
during [a] psychotic crisis ... as a primary ground for denying his release is so inherently unfair
and unreasonable that it meets the high standard ... warranting our intervention.”
4) Failure to Solicit a Letter from the Sentencing Court, the DA and Defense Counsel

60.

The Board must solicit a letter from the DA, defense counsel (at trial) and the

sentencing judge at the time of first parole eligibility. See 259-iIf the Board does not contact
trial Defense Counsel, the DA, or the Sentencing Judge, it is likely grounds for a de novo

interview.

5) The Denial of Parole Cannot Amount to an Illegal Resentencing
61.

The role of determining sentences is left to the legislature that enacted the

minimum and maximum permissible sentence for the crime of conviction, and by the judge who

imposed the sentence. In considering whether to grant parole, the Parole Board is limited to

determining whether release at the present time is appropriate under the statutory standards. King
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dep’t 1994) (“The role of the Parole Board is
not to resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members as to the

appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the

relevant statutory factors, he should be released.”) And see Ely v. Bd of Parole, 2016/100407
(Sup. Ct. NY Cnty, 2017) (“Petitioner’s COMPAS Assessment, lack of a prior criminal record,
age, infirmity, lengthy imprisonment to date, clear expression of remorse, acceptance of

responsibility for her crime, post-release plans, the many letters submitted by corrections

professionals in support of her release, and the many positive initiatives she undertook during her

incarceration, indicate that respondent’s denial of release was more in the nature of a re25
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sentencing, and that no amount of evidence of rehabilitation would have outweighed its interest
in retribution.”).

6) The Board Cannot Exclusively Focus on Nature of the Offense
62.

The 1st, 2nd and 4th Departments hold that the Board must consider all

statutory requirements and cannot base the decision to deny solely on the nature of the

crime. See King v. New York State Div . of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 433 (1st Dept 1993), aff d,
83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“...the legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should
not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the

inherent seriousness of the crime itself.); Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d
22, 27 (1st Dept 2016) (holding that the Board acted irrationally in focusing exclusively on the

seriousness of petitioner’s conviction and the decedent’s family’s victim impact
statements...without giving genuine consideration to petitioner’s remorse, institutional

achievements, release plan, and her lack of any prior violent criminal history.); V. Sullivan v.
NYSBd of Parole, 2018/100865 (S. Ct„ NY Cnty, 2019) (finding Board relied almost

exclusively on the seriousness of the crime and statements petitioner made at time of sentence);
Ramirez v. Evans , 118 A.D.3d 707 (2d Dept 2014); Perfetto v. Evans , 112 A.D.3d 640 (2d Dep’t
2013); Gelsomino v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 82 A.D.3d 1097 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“Here, in

denying the petitioner’s application for release on parole, the Parole Board cited only the
circumstances of the underlying crimes and failed to mention any of the other statutory factors,

including his excellent disciplinary record, his record of achievements while incarcerated, as well
as positive statements made by the sentencing court.”); Huntley v. Evans , 77 A.D.3d 945 (2d

Dep’t 2011) (“Where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely on the basis of the
seriousness of the offense, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, it acts
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irrationally.”)(emphasis added); Mitchell v. N.Y. State Div . of Parole , 58 A.D.3d 742 (2d Dep’t
2009)( While the seriousness of the underlying offense remains acutely relevant in determining

whether the petitioner should be released on parole, the record supports the petitioner’s
contention that the Parole Board failed to take other relevant statutory factors into account.);
Johnson v. New York State Div . of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dept 2009)

7) Failure to Consider Sentencing Minutes
63.

The Third Department held that “the failure to timely locate available sentencing

minutes” by the Board, in which “the sentencing judge nonetheless implicitly addressed [parole]

by discussing in some detail his discomfort with the required maximum range of the sentence
(i.e., life in prison) and then imposing less than the maximum on the lower range where he had

discretion,” was a violation of Executive Law § 259-i and grounds for a de novo hearing. In re
Duffy v. N.Y. State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty. Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207 (3d Dep’t 2015). See

also Matter of Phifer v. New York State Bd, of Parole, 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 32462(U), at *6 (Sup.
Ct. NY Cty. Aug. 21, 2019) where the Board failed to consider the sentencing minutes, and the
court ordered a de novo interview.

8) Insufficient Discussion of the Prisoner’s Earned Eligibility Certificate Requires_a
New Hearing

64.

The Regulations provide in relevant part that: “[A]n inmate who is serving a

sentence with a minimum term of not more than eight years and has been issued an Earned

Eligibility Certificate, shall be granted parole release at the expiration of his minimum term

... unless the board of parole determines that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate
is released, he will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is
not compatible with the welfare of society” (emphasis supplied). Failure to address such a

certificate except in the most conclusory terms warrants a new hearing, (emphasis supplied).
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See Matter of Schwartz v Dennison, 836 N.Y.S.2d 489, 14 Misc. 3d 1220(A), (Sup Ct, Apr. 18,
2006)( “However, this Court agrees with petitioner Schwartz that the Board’s discussion of the

relevant factors in this case, like that in Wallman, was perfunctory and unsupported by the
evidence in the record. Schwartz had a spotless disciplinary record in prison and proposed a
sound and confirmed release plan which included a place to live and employment. He
demonstrated that he had successfully completed the Sex Offender Program in prison, to the

point where he had assumed the role of mentor of others. Indeed, his Certificate of Earned
Eligibility issued by the Commissioner confirmed this fact. What is more, Schwartz discussed in

detail at his parole hearing his understanding and remorse for his conduct, and his release was

supported by countless letters from community members, including the parents of other Boy
Scouts. In addition, and quite significantly, Schwartz had been at liberty without incident for

several years after the conduct underlying the offense ceased in 1997 and his imprisonment in
2002. Thus, nothing in Schwartz’s record suggests a “reasonable probability” that he will be a
repeat offender or that his release would be contrary to the interests of the community. An

examination of the Parole Board decision reveals that it lacks a rational basis and fails to rebut

the presumption of release. The decision is centered on the Parole Board’s finding that
Schwartz would benefit from the completion of the sex offender program. The finding is

unsupported by the record evidence. Although Schwartz technically had a few weeks
remaining in the program when he first appeared before the Board, the Commissioner’s
issuance of the Certificate of Earned Eligibility represented the conclusion that Schwartz
had “successfully participated” in the program. What is more, by the time Schwartz had come

before the Appeals Board, he had completed the program in its entirety, yet the Appeals Unit

relied on the Board’s unsubstantiated and irrational finding that parole should be denied so that

28
28 of 46

INDEX NO.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/13/2020
FUSL000093

Schwartz could complete his program. The Panel then went on to conclude that Schwartz’s

“programming progress is not yet commensurate with the harm inflicted” on the victim. This
conclusion, as well, lacks a rational basis in the record. While harm to the victim is a
consideration at sentencing, it is not one of the stated statutory criteria for a parole
determination. Moreover, it is the Certificate of Earned Eligibility issued by the
Commissioner, rather than past harm to the victim as perceived by the Parole Board,

which is relevant proof of the inmate’s programming progress”(emphasis added)).
9)

Failure to Consider Reentry Plan
65.

The Board must consider applicant’s release and reentry plan. See Executive Law

259-i(c)(A)(iii), which states: “release plans including community resources, employment,

education and training and support services available to the inmate...shall be considered.” When

the Board focuses during the interview almost exclusively on the seriousness of the crime of
conviction, and there is virtually no reference to the person’s reentry plan, or a Board member

merely says something like “ We note your reentry plan ,” there are grounds for a de novo
hearing.
10) “Lack of Remorse” Must Be Substantiated by the Record
66.

The Parole Board is allowed to consider the parole applicants’ remorse (or lack

thereof) and insight into their crime in their decision. Silmon v. Travis , 95 N.Y.2d 470 (2000).
However, when the interview transcript indicates that the parole applicant repeatedly

demonstrated remorse, the Board cannot base their decision to deny on “lack of remorse.”

Wallman v. Travis , 18 A.D.3d 304 (1st Dep’t 2005). (“Moreover, the Board’s perfunctory

discussion of petitioner’s alleged lack of insight is contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision
in Matter of Silmon v Travis (95 NY2d at 477), which held that a petitioner’s remorse and insight
into his crimes are highly relevant in evaluating an inmate’s rehabilitative progress, especially
29
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where, as here, the prisoner has otherwise lived a law-abiding life and maintained a good prison
record. Despite the critical significance of these factors in evaluating an inmate under the

“reasonable probability” standard, the Board’s decision in this case offers no supportive facts
justifying its finding of lack of insight and remorse. The Board’s lack of supporting facts in its

written decision might be excused if the parole hearing record otherwise supported its

conclusion, but in this case it does not. The hearing transcript contains numerous statements by
petitioner demonstrating his understanding of the harm caused by his misconduct and his
remorse for it.”); Winchell v. Evans , 27 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty, 2010)

(Board’s denial, which was based on the petitioner failing to show remorse for the victim or her
family and not appearing to understand the seriousness of his crime was contradicted by the

record); Kellogg v New York State Board of Parole, 73 N.Y.S.3d 139, 141, 2018 WL 1162504
(1st Dept. 2018) (“At the parole hearing, petitioner nonetheless accepted responsibility for her

“choices and decisions that led to a chain of events that led to the death of [her] husband.” Far
from showing any lack of insight into her crime, petitioner’s testimony at the parole hearing was
truthful, accurate, and consistent with what the jury found happened in 1991. Accordingly,

respondent’s determination denying petitioner parole manifested “irrationality bordering on
impropriety,” warranting granting the petition to vacate the denial of parole’) Matter of Coleman
v New York State Dept, of Corr . & Community Supervision , 69 N.Y.S.3d 652, 2018 WL 343803

(2nd Dept. 2018)( “The Parole Board’s findings that there was a reasonable probability that, if

released, the petitioner would not remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
wouldbe incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of
the crime as to undermine respect for the law, are without support in the record ( see Matter

of Marino v Travis , 289 AD2d 493, 493 (2001). Contrary to the Parole Board’s determination

30
30 of 46

INDEX NO.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/13/2020
FUSL000093

that the petitioner “distance[d]” himself from the crime, the record demonstrates that the

petitioner took full responsibility for his actions.”)
11) The Prisoner’s Pre-Incarceration Record and the Plea Agreement Are Factors to
Be Weighed

67.

The conditions of a prisoner’s pre-incarceration bail, as well as his actions during

that pre-incarceration period, and the agreement by the DA and the sentencing court to reduce
a multi-count indictment as part of the plea , or even restate the charges, are relevant factors in

determining the proposed parolee’s likelihood of recidivism. Matter of Weinstein v Dennison ,
801 N.Y.S.2d 244, 7 Misc. 3d 1009(A), 2005 WL 856006 (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty. 2005).
12) Personal Opinions or Bias of Commissioners Cannot Play A Role in the Decision

68.

Commissioners may not base their decision on personal opinions or bias.

Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision , 46 Misc. 3d 603 (Sup. Ct.
Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (“The Commissioners based their decision to deny parole release to

petitioner solely on their personal opinions of the nature of the instant offense and improper

characterizations of petitioner’s actions immediately following the murder ... and at least one
Commissioner was argumentative and appeared to have made the decision prior to the parole

interview. ... There is no additional rationale, other than the Board’s opinion of the heinous
nature of the instant offense, and personal beliefs and speculations, to justify the denial of parole

release.”)
69.

In considering whether to grant parole, the Parole Board is limited to determining

whether the person is a present danger to society. King v. New York State Div . of Parole, 190
A.D.2d 423 (1st Dep’t 1994) A commissioner’s statement of his own opinion about the

appropriate sentence violates Executive Law §259-i. Almonor v. New York State Bd. of Parole ,
16 Misc.3d 1126(A) (Sup. Ct. New York Cnty. 2007) (“the Court notes the short length of the
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parole hearing, the Commissioners’ unwillingness to discuss petitioner’s letters in support of his
application and, in particular, Commissioner Rodriguez’s comment suggesting that he thought
petitioner’s sentence for manslaughter was too short.”)
70.

Mischaracterization of the instant offense and comments indicating no amount of

punishment wouldbe enough render the decisions denying parole irrational. Bruetsch v. New
York State Dep ’t of Corrections and Community Supervision , 43 Misc.3d 1223(A) (Sup. Ct.

Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (“[S]everal passages in the transcript ... suggest that the board viewed this
crime as premeditated, completely mischaracterizing the incident as understood by the trial court
and jury. Another comment indicates the board was of the opinion that Petitioner could never
make amends for killing his wife.”)
13) Predetermined Decisions Are Prohibited

71.

Indications that the parole denial was predetermined is a ground for a de novo

interview. See King v . New York State Div . of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, affd. 83 N.Y.2d 788;

Johnson v. N.Y. Bd. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“We therefore conclude on the
record before us that the Parole Board failed to weigh all of the relevant statutory factors and that

there is ‘a strong indication that the denial of petitioner’s application was a foregone
conclusion.’”) See also Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision , 46 Misc.
3d 603 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (“at least one Commissioner was argumentative and

appeared to have made the decision prior to the parole interview.”); Morris v. N.Y. State Dep ’t of
Corr . & Cmty. Supervision , 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty. 2013) (“When, as here,

the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature of Petitioner’s crime, there is a strong
indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion that does not comport with
statutory requirements.”(emphasis supplied)).
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14) A Failure to Balance All Factors Is Grounds for a New Hearing

72.

Parole Board decisions, on their face, must show a careful balancing of all factors

in order to avoid being found inappropriate. The consideration of factors may not be summary in
nature.

“[I]t is unquestionably the duty of the Board to give fair consideration to each of the

applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before it, and where the record
convincingly demonstrates that the Board did in fact fail to consider the proper standards, the
courts must intervene... .The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner, according
to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty ..., but to determine

whether, as of this moment , given all of the relevant statutory factors, he should be released. In
that regard, the statute expressly mandates that the prisoner’s educational and other achievements
affirmatively be taken into consideration in determining whether he meets the general criteria

relevant to parole release under * 1064 section 259-i (2) (c).” (Id. at 431-432 [emphasis added].)
Matter

of Matter of Platten v NYS Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059, 1063

64, 5 N.Y.S.3d 702,

-

2015 WL 1442454 (Sup Ct 2015).
73.

Judge Billings set forth the appropriate considerations in Matter of Matter of

Coaxum v New York State Bd. of Parole, 827 N.Y.S.2d 489, 14 Misc. 3d 661, 668-670, 2006

WL 3524328 (Sup Ct NY County 2006):

“The decision making is a process of determining which factors

outweigh others: a balancing process. ( Anthony v New York State
Div. of Parole, 17 AD3d at 301; Matter of Kirkpatrick v Travis , 5
AD3d 385 (2d Dept 2004) Matter of Wright v Travis , 284 AD2d 544
(2d Dept 2001); Matter of Guerin v New York State Div. of Parole ,
276 AD2d 899, 900 (3d Dept 2000) Here, however, the Board’s
decision reveals it accorded no weight and no emphasis whatsoever
to any factor apart from the seriousness of petitioner’s offense.
(Friedgood v New York State Bd. of Parole , 22 AD3d at
951 ; see Anthony v New York State Div. of Parole, 17 AD3d at
301; Matter of Torres v New York State Div . of Parole , 300 AD2d
128, 129 [1st Dept 2002]; Garcia v New York State Div. of Parole,
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239 AD2d at 239; Vasquez v State
Parole, 20 AD3d at 669.)

of N.Y.

Exec. Dept., Div.

of

By admitting that petitioner could not have done and could not in the
future do anything more or differently to lend greater weight to the
factors other than her offense and tip the Board’s decision to a
conclusion in her favor, the Board demonstrates that those
considerations did not weigh to any degree in its decision making;
the Boardbalanced nothing. ( Torres v New York State Div. of Parole,
300 AD2d at 129; Garcia v New York State Div . of Parole, 239
AD2d at 239; Matter of Klein v New York State Div. of Parole, 202
AD2d 319, 320 (1st Dept 1994); Guerin v New York State Div. of
Parole, 276 AD2d at 900.) If this admission and the absence of any
weight or emphasis accorded to any other factors otherwise revealed
by the decision do not amount to “insufficient” weight on those other
factors or to “excessive weight” (Matter of Ramirez v New York State
Div . of Parole, 309 AD2d 574 [1st Dept 2003 ]), or “undue emphasis
on the seriousness of petitioner’s offense, nothing does. (Matter of
Stasinski v Travis , 18 AD3d 1106, 1107 [3d Dept
2005 ]; see Wallman v Travis , 18 AD3d at 307-308; Matter of Morel
v Travis , 18 AD3d 930, 931 [3d Dept 2005...contrary to the statutory
discretion authorized. ( Wallman v Travis , 18 AD3d at 307-308.)

Consistent with the statutory objectives of rehabilitation and
readiness for release, moreover, the Board was mandated to
determine whether petitioner, if released, would “remain at liberty
without violating the law” and whether her release was “not
incompatible with the welfare of society.” (Executive Law § 259-i
[2] [c ] [A]; Silmon v Travis , 95 NY2d at 476; King v New York State
Div . of Parole, 83 NY2d at 790; Garcia v New York State Div. of
Parole, 239 AD2d at 238.) Nowhere does the Board’s decision
reflect an assessment whether petitioner posed a danger to society
or would repeat her criminal conduct. ( Silmon v Travis , 95 NY2d at
477.) Certainly, if the Board had evaluated petitioner’s total
reform and rehabilitation, the Board would have determined that
this 52-year-old grandmother posed no threat, but realistically
promised to contribute to society’s welfare and was ready to rejoin
the community outside prison. (Id. at 478; Friedgood v New York
State Bd. of Parole, 22 AD3d at 951. Petitioner has achieved the
loftiest goals of New York’s statutory penal and corrections system:
reform and rehabilitation. (Id. at 477.) To deny her parole
supervision as the Board did is to deny that the system contains any
rehabilitative component” or parole supervision and to contravene
the statutory goals. (M)”(emphasis added).
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ARGUMENT
THE PAROLE BOARD DETERMINATION SHOULD BE REVERSED

74.

The Parole Board’s discretion is not unbridled and must be exercised in

accordance with law. King v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 430, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1st
Dept.), Iv. denied 82 N.Y.2d 746, 602 N.Y.S.2d 799, 622 N.E.2d 300 (1993); Ekv .
Travis, NYLJ, Feb. 25, 2005 at 21, col. 3 (Sup.Ct. Albany Cnty.)(Sheridan, J.); Cappiello v.

N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc.3d 1010A (Sup.Ct., N.Y. Cnty., 2004) And, since there is a strong

rehabilitation component in the statutory parole scheme, the Board is mandated to consider an
inmate’s institutional record, release plans, the sentence imposed, and prior criminal record and

activities following arrest and prior to confinement. Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718
N.Y.S.2d 704; King supra at 431, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245; Eh, supra. Moreover, remorse and insight
are proper considerations. Silmon, id. ”[W]hen there is a showing of irrationality bordering on

impropriety,” the Board’s decision denying parole must be held to be arbitrary and

capricious. Silmon, id.; Marino v. Travis, 13 A.D.3d 453, 454, 787 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dept.2004).
75.

The Board’s decision in this case was arbitrary and capricious.

76.

The Board, in denying Mr.

’ parole, did not follow the law. Executive

Law § 259-c and 9 NYCRR § 8001.3 require the Board to follow the guidelines created by the

Board, guidelines based on the severity of an inmate’s offense and his past criminal record. 9
NYCRR 8002.3(a), then mandates that the programs, therapy, work assignments and

interpersonal relationships in prison be considered with the guidelines. Here the Board gave no
more than lip service to the programs and therapy successfully completed by Mr.

,I his

work in the prison therapeutic hierarchy, his positive relationship with his prison counselor, his
low COMPAS score, the observations of his counselor in the in-prison rehabilitation program,
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his Earned Eligibility Certificate, his post-release plans, which included supportive friends and

family, a home and employment. The Board ignored his introspection, and the openness and
remorse he discussed at his hearing. It also failed to consider the views of Dr. Krueger, a

renowned expert in the field of treating perpetrators of sexual offenses, especially those
involving underage victims, who, along with his psychiatric staff had engaged in psychotherapy

with Mr.

for over two years following his arrest and who stated in a 2020 letter to the

Parole Board making it clear that Mr.

was welcome back into his program:

.

.

remains the opinion of Dr Martinez, Dr Kaplan, and
myself that his risk of sexually re-offense is exceedingly

“It

remote ....

.

Drs Martinez, Kaplan and I have been for two years and continue
to befirmly of the opinion that Mr
’\ s efforts to engage in
therapy and rehabilitate himself have been extraordinary; he has
embraced sex offender specific therapy fully and made great
progress to date ”

.

.

77.

An understanding of how utterly arbitrary the Board’s decision was has We have

to start with a major error on the part of the Parole Board, which laid an erroneous underlying

basis for the Parole Board’s decision, as stated.
78.

On page 3, line 4, Commissioner Berliner is reported to have asked:

Q. November of 2016 in Manhattan you possessed images of
sexual conduct by a child less than 16 years of age. Much of
2017 you possessed more than 3000 images and 89 videos
depicting young nude females between the ages of six
months and 12 months engaging in sexual conduct such as
vaginal intercourse and performing oral sex on an adult male.
79.

In fact:
a.

The original criminal complaint (Ex. A) charged Mr.

with

possessing 3000 images depicting young nude females between the ages of six months and
sixteen years (not 12 months.)
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b.

Mr.

was ultimately indicted (Ex. B) for possession of 33 images

of females under 17, all of which had downloaded and deleted on the same date in February

2015, but which remained in his cache.
c.

Mr.

pled guilty to one count of possession of an image of a

female under 16 years of age. (See Exhibit D).
80.

It seems clear that the Parole Board believed that Mr.

had been charged

with and found guilty of possessing 3000 images and 89 videos of females engaged in sex acts
who were under 12 months of age. No matter how shocking the actual original charge was

possession of a large number of images of females engaged in sex acts who were under 16 years
of age—possession of 3000 images and videos of females under 12 months of age would be far
more shocking.

81.

This misperception, and the decision by the Board to focus its questions on a

wrong version of the charge, explains a lot. It explains the first question on page 3, line 14:
“ Mr .

what is going on? What happened here? ” And it explains why the Board was

not satisfied with the extremely self-analytical discussion by Mr.

about his own self-

examination, about how he began to view pornography at age 10, about his depression, about his
desire to speak with someone about his obsession, but his fear of doing so, about his self-loathing
and the spiral of behavior from self-loathing to obsession. A misperception of the crime charged
(much less the crime pled to) is the only way that they could have described what Mr.

said on Transcript pages 3 -5 as involving a lack of “insight.” Mr.

’ discussion,

reflective of two years of pre-imprisonment psychotherapy (which the Board brushed off because

his principal psychotherapist was the partner of the psychiatrist who did the psychological testing
and who authored the report to the Court and the Parole Board), and his work in prison (which he
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discussed as unexpectedly enlightening), was extremely insightful, and reflected the mindset of
someone armed to deal with recidivist urges in the future.

82.

The decision denying parole seemed to turn, a great deal, on Mr.

s

discussion of the impact on victims. The Parole Decision, Transcript at page 21, states:
“ While you were able to discuss the crimes clearly and with
significant insight into what led to your behaviors, your discussion
of the children who were harmed required prompting and
remained abstract and disconnectedfrom real empathy. ”

83.

This finding, however, is not reflective of what Mr.

stated or how he

stated it, whether it be about the crime he was originally charged with, the crime he was indicted
for, or the crime he pled guilty to. This is part of what he said:
“I am extremely sorry for what I did and it is something that I
know a lot of people talk about —I mean, I heard a lot of people
through therapy talk about wanting to put this sort of situation
behind them, but I very much don ’t. I —this is something that I
want to carry with mefor the rest of my life productively . I want to
use it either to help other people in similar situations or just for
myself. ”

84.

Then, when the Commissioner followed up with: “One last questionIneglected

to ask you ... This is not a victimless crime,” (Transcript at page 17) the following exchange

occurred:
A.

No. Absolutely not.

Q.

... [W]hat do you think about the little children out there who
were brutalized along the way.

A.

... I think it is really horrible and it cuts me pretty deep when
I think about it. In the days and months and years since my
arrest I have experienced a small fraction of the exposure
that they experienced in having the porn created and I can
say from my own experiences that that has been pretty
devastating and I can ’t imagine how devastating to them. It
would have that be—for something completely out of your
control, but also from a very young age and just for your
entire life ... I mean, it cuts me pretty deep. That is part of
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why this is not something I want to put behind me, because I
do think that having this experience and also having the
experience leading up to it of the behavior I exhibited, I hope
that I have something to contribute to preventing, you know,
further abuse or dissemination ofporn in thefuture. ”
85.

Somehow, after these responses, the Parole Panel simply states that “while the

panel acknowledges your work and programming before and during your incarceration, there
are concerns that you lack some insight into the harm your actions caused, however indirectly.

While you were able to discuss the crimes clearly and with significant insight into what led to
your behaviors, your discussions of the children who were harmed required prompting and

remained abstract and disconnected from real empathy .’ ' Transcript at page 21.
86.

This conclusion bears no relationship either to the interview, or to what Mr.

so eloquently said in the tense setting of a 15 -minute parole hearing. Andunless the

Commissioners forgot what Mr.

said, this conclusion could only have flowed from a

belief that he was guilty of possessing 3000 images and 89 videos of sex acts being performed
on children between the ages of six months and 12 months, which they note as the one

conclusory reason for departing from the COMPAS: “the nature of the crime itself.” Transcript
at page 20, line 23.

87.

9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) requires that “if a board determination denying release

departs from the Department Risk andNeeds Assessment’s score, the board shall specify any
scale within the Department Risk andNeeds Assessment from which it departed and provide an
individualized reason for such a departure.” The Panel in Mr.

’s case blatantly ignored

this requirement. This alone requires a reversal/
88.

Mr.

|’s COMPAS score ranked him as posing a low risk for recidivism.

His Earned Eligibility Certificate and counselor’s notes attested to his successful completion of
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the institutional program, and his leadership role in the therapy program. The Panel,
nevertheless, simply found a “lack of insight” which he could gain from “completing” the inprison program which he had already completed, and a conclusory statement that his

“discretionary release would be incompatible with the welfare of society.”
89.

The Panel clearly paid only lip server to Mr.

’s extensive therapy work

prior to prison, and his outstanding achievements in prison (which included a leadership role),
his COMPAS rating, and his Certificate of Earned Eligibility. Their focus was clearly on what

they believed his crime to be. Whether the offense was the one stated in the initial criminal

complaint, or the one stated in the indictment, or the offense Mr.

as convicted of, the

Parole Panel’s focus on the “seriousness of the offense” in the absence of aggravating

circumstances, and in the face of the prisoner’s achievement, was irrational. See Mitchell v. NYS
Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3 d 742 (2d Dept. 2009). And it is clear that the COMPAS rating and the
Certificate of Earned Eligibility were not properly addressed.
90.

Section 259—i (2) of the Executive Law required the Board to consider Mr.

’ institutional record and his release plans. Further, as noted by the court in Silmon,
supra, 95 N.Y.2d 476, the Board is mandated to consider the sentence imposed,

recommendations of the District Attorney, prior criminal record and activities following arrest
and prior to confinement. As we discussed above, other than remarking on Mr.
commendable institutional record, no focus was given to that institutional record, and no
comment was made about his performance in the two years Mr.

remained free on bail

prior to incarceration and nothing was said of his plans for release. This was far from the careful
consideration of the requisite factors demanded by the statutory parole scheme. See Tarter,
supra, 68 N.Y.2d 517.
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91.

Executive Law § 259—i (2) directs the Board to give detailed reasons for denying

parole and prohibits the Board from stating those reasons in conclusory terms. See Boudin, 6
Misc.3d 1005A. Although, the Board need not specify each statutory factor considered, the

Board is required to do more than merely mouth the statutory criteria, particularly whereas here
each factor recited and brought forth in the parole interview, other than the crime itself, militated
in favor of release. See King, 190 A.D.2d 434 (parole board breached its obligation to render a

qualitative judgment based upon review of all relevant factors where mention was made of
statutory factors, all of which weighed in inmate’s favor, but were dismissed in light of

seriousness of crime); Ek, supra, NYLJ, Feb. 25, 2005 at 21, col. 3 (Board’s conclusory
statement which failed to explicate the facts considered violated statutory scheme and derogated

rehabilitative component underlying indeterminate sentencing). Here the Board did no more than

|’ COMPAS score, and his Earned Eligibility Certificate, ignored the

mention Mr.

monthly assessments from his counselor, and made a conclusory assessment about Petitioner’s

“lack of insight.”
92.

It was inappropriate for the Board to focus solely on what it believed (contrary to

the what was said at the hearing, and what was set out in the extensive record) was Mr.

’s “abstract response” when asked about the victims of his offense, and his “empathy”,
without “prompting,” for the victims of child pornography. (The Board’s choice of words was

interesting, since “empathy” is defined in Miriam Webster’s dictionary as “experiencing as one’s
own ,the feelings of another,” which is a complex, abstract concept. Mr.

did, in fact,

discuss comparing his feelings of exposure and lack of control in prison with the experience of
the victims.) The Board’s decision, in effect, was no more than a resentencing to a definite term
of two years, to be followed by a conditional release. While they mouthed a “belief ’ that
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continued therapeutic work in prison would be to Mr.

benefit, they made that statement

with knowledge (assuming that they had reviewed the record) that his participation in prison
programs was about to end, that he had a Certificate of Earned Eligibility, and that his counselor

had made her COMPAS recommendation based on his completion of most of his in-prison
sessions. In fact, his counselor, in Mr.

’ most recent monthly assessment, made a point

of emphasizing his participation in the “prison hierarchy.” In fact, the Board was aware that Dr.
Krueger had expressly written to the Board to assure them that Mr.

into his program, and that the only opportunity Mr.

was welcome back

would have until his

conditional release to engage in therapy would be outside of prison, not in it. To deny a

prisoner parole based on what they saw as some hesitancy in answering one question, (a
conclusion the transcript belies) in what was clearly a pressure-filled interview, was evidence

only of a pre-conceived decision by the Boardbased solely on the nature of Mr.

.

’ crime

not the danger his release could cause to society. Their decision was punitive and neither

corrective, nor was it designed to build on Mr.
93.

’ three years of work in therapy.

The Sentencing Court had decided that an indeterminate term of imprisonment of

1 to 3 years was appropriate, and the District Attorney made clear at the plea proceedings that his

office believed the 1 year minimum sufficient in Mr.

’ case. In fact, the DA dropped 65

.

of the 66 counts in the indictment in return for a plea. The seriousness of the crime, of course
may be considered by the Board, but the “conviction per se should not preclude parole, there

must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the

crime itself.” King, supra at 433, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245. Accord Phillips v. Travis, NYLJ, March 15,
2005, at 18, col. 3 (Sup.Ct., N.Y.Cnty.) (Schlesinger, J.). See also Cappiello, supra, 6 Misc.3d
1010A (although parole board is to consider severity of crime, its role is to evaluate inmate’s
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danger to society in light of his comportment during incarceration, not to resentence him). There
were no aggravating factors here. In fact, the Board focused on it misperception of the

allegations of the criminal complaint, little of which made it into the indictment, and none of

which was discussed by the Sentencing Judge after Mr.

pleaded guilty to one count of

possession.

94.

Finally, the Board’s decision ran afoul of Correction Law § 850 and 9 NYCRR §

8002.3(c). That statutory and regulatory scheme creates a presumption favoring parole release

where an inmate is serving an indeterminate sentence with a minimum period of less than 8 years
and has been awarded an Earned Eligibility Certificate. Petitioner fell into this category.
Consequently, he should have been granted release unless there was a reasonable probability that

he would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and his release would not be

compatible with the welfare of society. See Marino, supra, 13 A.D.2d 453. The Board’s
conclusory statement simply citing to Mr.

’ response to one question (a response which

actually showed deep thought about the consequences of his criminal behavior) failed to do this.
95.

Nothing in the more than 3 years since Mr.

’arrest pointed to a likelihood

of recidivism. Rather, the facts before the Board, and the transcript of the hearing, speak of a kind,
temperate and insightful individual who workedhard prior to being imprisoned, and while in

prison, to understand the nature of his offense and reign in whatever instincts or psychiatric
disabilities led to the crime. He is blessed with family and friends willing to provide him with
support and a home upon release and employment which will make him self-sufficient. The

Board’s unfounded conclusory statement that ’’there is a reasonable probability that [Mr.
would not live andremain at liberty without violating the law” and that his “release is thus not

presently compatible with the public safety and welfare,” is but an empty recitation of the statutory
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exception. Without any reasons, much less the required detailed reasons for departing from the
COMPAS assessment or the Earned Eligibility Certificate, and with a record which suggests

otherwise, that finding are “irrational bordering on impropriety.” Accordingly, the Board’s
decision denying Mr.
96.

parole was arbitrary and capricious and shouldbe reversed.

It is clear that the Panel relied on an inaccurate record, made a decision

unsupported by the record, failed to discuss COMPAS or the Earned Eligibility Certificate, and
never contacted the DA or the sentencing judge, all of which are grounds for annulling the denial

and granting an expedited de novo interview. Rivera v. Stamford, 172 A.D.3d 872 (2d Dept.
2019). Furthermore, the Panel’s description of Mr.

’s discussion of the victims as

“lacking empathy” bears no resemblance to the record. Coleman v. NY State Dept, of
Corrections , 157 A.D.3d 672, 673 (2d Dept. 2018); Wallman v. Travis , 18 A.D.3d 304 (1st Dept.

2015); and cases cited on pages 23 -24 of our original letter.
97.

The Parole Panel’s denial of parole here, at Mr.

’s one-year date, was an

egregious violation of his rights. The denial has been made particularly egregious because of the
COVTD-19 problem, its prevalence in the prison system, and Mr.

documented,

underlying heart condition which places him in a higher risk category (health wise). See Exhibit X.
98.

Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each of the claims set forth above

in each of the Causes of Action set forth below.
AS AND FOR A FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION

99.

By its aforedescribed actions, Respondent violated Executive Law Section 259-i.

AS AND FOR A SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION
100.

By its aforedescribed actions, Respondent violated 9 NYCRR 8000-8011.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this Court enter judgment:

(a)

Declaring unlawful, null and void the March 4, 2020 determination of the Board

of Parole made with respect to the parole application of petitioner

, denying

him parole at the end of the first year of his sentence;
(b)

Directing, requiring and commanding Respondent to schedule a new Parole

Hearing, to be conducted in according with the Executive Law of the State of New York and all
attendant regulations, which properly addresses Petitioner’s COMPAS rating, his Certificate of
Earned Eligibility, the recommendations of his prison counselor, the charges of which he was
convicted, his pre-imprisonment psychiatric evaluation, his post prison plans and support, and all
other statutory and regulatory factors, and to issue a new Determination within seven (7) days of

that new Parole Hearing; and
(c)

Granting such other and further relief as is just and equitable;

Dated: New York, New York
July 6, 2020
ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE
Chartered ATTORNEYS
Attorneysfor Petitioner

By:

Arthur Z. Schwartz
225 Broadway, Suite 1902
New York, New York 10007
Tel.: (212) 285-1400
Fax: (212) 285 -1410
aschwartz@afjlaw.com
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VERIFICATION

Arthur Z. Schwartz, an attorney at law duly admitted to the Bar of the State of New York,
and attorney for Petitioner, based upon my own knowledge, information, and belief, verifies that
the aforestated Petition is true.
Dated: July 6, 2020

ARTHUR Z. SCHWARTZ
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